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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2867 
___________ 
 
MARCIA COPELAND, M.D., 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TOWNSHIP OF BELLMAWR; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY;  
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE (NJ); JIM BRALEY, (individual/official);  
MAYOR OF BELLMAWR; JSC MARY EVA COLALILLO;  
JSC DEBORAH SILVERMAN KATZ; JSC ROBERT MILLENKY;  
ROBERT SALDUTTI, ESQ.; ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON  
JUDICIAL CONDUCT; BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY;  
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING INSPECTION;  
LISA SHARKEY; JUDGE ANTHONY PUGLISI;  
ANDREW KARCICH, Esq.; SCOTT LEVINE, Esq.;  
JANE DOE (XYZ); MARTY ABO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-12104) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2019 
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 26, 2019) 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Marcia Copeland appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing her 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Copeland is a Doctor of Medicine who owns or has owned several rental 
properties in New Jersey.  This appeal involves her fifth federal complaint arising from 
matters that already have been extensively litigated in New Jersey state and federal 
courts.  Copeland’s claims relate to a default judgment entered against her in state court 
and to the allegedly conspiratorial involvement of various parties (including state court 
judges) in entering, obtaining and collecting on that judgment.  We described the 
underlying dispute in some detail in Copeland v. United States Department of Justice, 
675 F. App’x 166, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam).  In that appeal, we affirmed the 
dismissal of Copeland’s fourth complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that it was barred by 
preclusion doctrines and that it otherwise failed to state a claim.  See id. at 171-73. 
 Undeterred, and after unsuccessfully seeking to recall our mandate, Copeland filed 
pro se the complaint at issue here.  Copeland repeated many of the same allegations and 
named, as defendants, many of the same parties.  The only new defendants she named 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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were the Township of Bellmawr, its mayor, and a zoning officer.  Copeland appeared to 
claim that these new defendants were involved in the same conspiracy against her that 
she previously alleged.  She also appeared to claim that Township personnel trespassed 
on one of her properties in 2007. 
 The District Court, acting on the largely unopposed motions of all defendants, 
dismissed Copeland’s complaint with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In doing 
so, the District Court adopted its previous decisions addressing Copeland’s previous 
complaints.  The District Court also concluded that Copeland’s claims against the new 
defendants were barred by, among other things, New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine 
and the applicable statutes of limitations.  Copeland appeals.1 
II. 
 We will affirm for the reasons explained by the District Court and for the reasons 
we explained in Copeland’s prior appeal.  Copeland has not meaningfully disputed those 
reasons or even mentioned most of them in her briefs.  Nor has she even mentioned the 
new defendants, let alone raised anything meaningfully challenging the dismissal of her 
claims against them.  Instead, Copeland’s briefs consist of little more than vitriolic and 
                                              
1 In addition to dismissing Copeland’s complaint, the District Court ordered her to show 
cause why it should not enjoin her from filing future claims based on the same subject 
matter.  That show-cause proceeding remains pending.  The District Court’s order of 
dismissal is final, however, and we have jurisdiction to review it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
See Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1996).  We review de novo the 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.  Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian 
Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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unsubstantiated accusations of judicial bias and corruption.  None of those accusations 
warrants relief.2  Nevertheless, we have reviewed de novo Copeland’s complaint and her 
numerous other filings in both the District Court and this Court and conclude, for reasons 
that do not require additional discussion, that the District Court properly dismissed her 
complaint with prejudice.  
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Copeland’s 
“motion to compel answers and requests for production of evidence” is denied.  To the 
extent that Copeland’s filings can be construed to request any other forms of relief, those 
requests are denied as well.  We express no opinion on the show-cause proceeding 
pending in the District Court.  Nor will we sua sponte consider imposing sanctions of our 
own at this time.  Copeland is cautioned, however, that we may consider imposing 
sanctions in the future if she persists in filing appeals or other proceedings arising from 
the same subject matter as this one. 
                                              
2 Copeland claims, for example, that although she paid the $400 filing fee for her 
complaint, the District Court denied her due process by basing its decision on “deception, 
telepathy, use of a crystal ball, bias and a touch of senility.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 10.)  The 
District Court did not deny Copeland due process, and her payment of the filing fee was 
required by her decision to file this repetitive complaint. 
